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1. INTRODUCTION 
 
Arguably the most momentous economic event in the world during the 2010-2012 period was 
the eurozone sovereign debt crisis.  The sovereign debt crises in the PIIGS economies 
(Portugal, Ireland, Italy, Greece, Spain) and other eurozone economies led to a substantial 
downgrading in the credit ratings of private and government debt in many eurozone economies.  
Heightened uncertainty in the eurozone should have led to an adjustment of investor portfolios 
away from eurozone assets and towards alternative assets including those of Japan, emerging 
Asia, and other non-eurozone economies. 
 
However, the (potential) sovereign debt crisis in Japan looks even more serious than those in 
the eurozone economies if one looks only at the gross general government debt-to-GDP ratio.  
Table 1 shows the gross general government debt-to-GDP ratio for the member countries of the 
Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) in 2012, and as can be seen 
from this table, this ratio ranged from 90 to 166 percent in the PIIGS economies in 2012 (“only” 
165.6 percent in Greece, 140.2 percent in Italy, 138.8 percent in Portugal, 123.3 percent in 
Ireland, and 90.5 percent in Spain) but was a full 219.1 percent in Japan in the same year.  
Thus, Japan’s gross general government debt-to-GDP ratio is more than twice the OECD-wide 
average (108.8 percent) and by far the highest in the developed world.  Moreover, the OECD 
projects that Japan’s gross general government debt-to-GDP ratio will increase even further to 
228.4 percent in 2013 and 233.1 percent in 2014. 
 
Why has Japan been able to avoid the fiscal crises of the magnitude faced by the PIIGS 
economies even though her gross general government debt-to-GDP ratio is much higher?  
What is different about Japan?  The most commonly given answer is that domestic saving is 
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much higher (relative to domestic investment) and home bias is much stronger in Japan, as a 
result of which a much higher proportion of her massive government debt could be absorbed 
domestically without having to rely on foreign investors. 
 
The objective of this paper is to present data on trends over time in government debt financing 
in Japan since 2010 with emphasis on the importance of foreign holders and to speculate about 
the determinants of those trends, thereby shedding light on whether or not the aforementioned 
conventional wisdom is correct. 
 
To summarize our main findings, we find that Japanese government securities were held 
primarily by domestic holders until recently because robust domestic saving (combined with 
strong home bias) made it possible for domestic investors to absorb most of the government 
debt but that foreign holdings of Japanese government securities have increased sharply in 
recent years, especially in the case of short-term government securities.  We show that trends 
in foreign holdings of Japanese government securities can be explained by conventional 
economic factors such returns and risks and that the recent surge in foreign holdings of short-
term Japanese government securities is attributable to foreign investors in search of a safe 
haven for their funds in the face of the Global Financial Crisis of 2008-09 precipitated by the 
Lehman crisis.  Our analysis suggests that the surge in foreign holdings of Japanese 
government securities will subside (in fact, it already has), and this, combined with the projected 
decline in domestic saving (especially household saving) caused by population aging, will make 
it necessary for Japan to get its fiscal house in order.  Thus, Japan’s massive government debt 
has not wreaked havoc in the past because of robust domestic saving and a temporary inflow of 
foreign capital caused by the Global Financial Crisis, but it may wreak havoc in the future as 
both of these factors become less applicable unless the government debt can be brought under 
control. 
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The remainder of this paper is organized as follows:  In section 2, we describe the data sources  
used in this paper; in section 3, we present data on trends over time in government debt 
financing in Japan since 2000 with emphasis on the importance of foreign holders; in section 4, 
we explore the reasons for the sharp increase in foreign holdings of short-term Japanese 
government securities in recent years; and in section 5, we summarize our findings and explore 
the policy implications of our findings. 
 
 
2. DATA SOURCES 
 
In this section, we describe the data sources used in this paper.   
 
The data on trends over time in government debt financing in Japan in subsections 3.1, 3.2, and 
3.3 are taken from the Bank of Japan’s Flow of Funds Accounts (FFA) Statistics (Shikin Junkan 
Toukei).  The FFA records movements of financial assets and liabilities among institutional units 
called sectors, such as financial institutions, corporations, and households, for various financial 
instruments called transaction items such as deposits and loans.  Thus, the FFA includes data 
on holdings of government securities by each sector of the economy and hence can shed light 
on who is financing Japan’s government debt.  For a more detailed description of the FFA in 
English, refer to http://www.boj.or.jp/en/statistics/sj/index.htm/ 
 
The data on foreign debt holdings by economy or region in subsection 3.4 are taken from the 
Coordinated Portfolio Investment Survey (CPIS) of the International Monetary Fund (IMF), 
which collects year-end data on portfolio investment holdings (equity and debt securities) from 
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participating economies.  The data on Japan in this survey are taken from, and hence are 
identical to, the Bank of Japan’s Balance of Payments Statistics. 
 
 
3. TRENDS IN GOVERNMENT DEBT FINANCING IN JAPAN, 2000-2011 
 
In this section, we present data on trends over time in government debt financing in Japan 
during the 2000-2011 period.  Since short-term government securities (government bills or 
money market instruments with maturities of less than one year) and medium- and long-term 
government securities (government bonds and notes with maturities of one year or more) show 
very different patterns and trends over time, we analyze the two categories of government 
securities separately. 
 
 
3.1. Trends in Domestic Holdings of Japanese Government Securities, 2000-2011 
 
In this subsection, we discuss trends over time in domestic holdings of Japanese government 
securities during the 2000-2011 period. 
 
Figure 1 shows trends over time in the shares of short-term Japanese government securities of 
each sector during the 2000-2011 period, and as can be seen from this figure, private banks 
have been by far the dominant holder of short-term government securities throughout the 2000-
2011 period, with their share fluctuating in the 50 to 90 percent range and far exceeding the 
shares of the Bank of Japan, government financial institutions, the general government, foreign 
holders, and other sectors.  However, the share of private banks declined sharply during the 
2000-2011 period--from more than 90 percent in 2000 to less than 50 percent in 2011, and the 
5 
 
share of government financial institutions increased between 2000 and 2006 but declined 
sharply to virtually zero thereafter, presumably due to the Japanese government’s policy of 
relying less on postal savings as a source of funds for financing the government debt.1  
 
Figure 2 shows trends over time in the shares of medium- and long-term Japanese government 
securities of each sector during the 2000-2011 period, and as can be seen from this figure, 
private banks have been by far the dominant holder of medium- and long-term government 
securities throughout the 2000-2011 period, as in the case of short-term government securities, 
but their share (30 to 45 percent) has been far lower than in the case of short-term government 
securities, and government financial institutions, insurance companies, the Bank of Japan, and 
public pensions have also held relatively large shares, at least during certain periods.  Looking 
at trends over time, the share of private banks has increased throughout the 2000-2011 period 
(unlike in the case of short-term government securities) and the shares of private insurance 
companies and public pensions have also increased, whereas the shares of government 
financial institutions decreased sharply to virtually zero due to the Japanese government’s 
policy of relying less on postal savings as a source of funds for financing the government debt.  
(The share of the Bank of Japan increased until 2002, declined until December 2009, and has 
shown a renewed upturn since then.) 
 
Thus, private investors (especially private banks) have been the dominant holders of Japanese 
government securities, and their relative importance has increased over time in the case of 
medium- and long-term government securities.  By contrast, the relative importance of public 
                                                 
1 Until 2000, postal savings and pension reserves had to be invested in the Trust Funds Bureau of the Ministry of 
Finance and provided the source of funds for the Fiscal Loan and Investment Program (FILP), which was initially 
used for direct government spending and loans to quasi-governmental corporations but was increasingly used for 
the purchase of government securities.  A law enacted in May 2000 put an end to the compulsory deposit of postal 
savings and pension reserves in the Ministry of Finance’s Trust Fund Bureau and required that FILP raise funds, 
on an as-needed basis, by floating "FILP bonds" (essentially Japanese government bonds) on the market (Tanaka 
(2010)).  
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investors (especially government financial institutions, which until the 1990s were the major 
holders of Japanese government securities and played the important role of ensuring a stable 
flow of funds from postal savings to government securities) has decreased sharply over time.  It 
should be noted, however, that private investors include Japan Postal Bank and Japan Post 
Insurance, the privatized versions of the formerly government-owned postal savings and postal 
life insurance systems.  Although Japan Postal Bank and Japan Post Insurance are technically 
private, their shares are still 100 percent government-owned and the current government has 
the explicit goal of deprivatizing them.  The combined share of Japan Postal Bank and Japan 
Post Insurance in total government debt was 23 percent in 2011, and the total share of public 
investors was 43 percent in the same year if Japan Postal Bank and Japan Post Insurance are 
classified as public investors.  Thus, the high and rising share of private investors in total 
government debt is largely illusory.2 
 
As for household holdings of Japanese government securities, the share of direct holdings of 
government securities by Japanese households has been very low throughout the 2000-2011 
period: they have been zero throughout this period in the case of short-term government 
securities and increased from 2 percent in 2000 to about 5 percent since 2007 in the case of 
medium- and long-term government securities.  Note, however, that holdings of Japanese 
government securities by government financial institutions, private banks, and insurance 
companies are financed by the bank and postal deposits, insurance policies, and pension funds 
of households and hence are indirectly held by households.  Thus, households have played a 
crucial albeit indirect role in government debt financing, and the high household saving rate in 
past years helped make possible the largely domestic absorption of Japanese government 
securities.   
 
                                                 
2 We are indebted to Peter Morgan for this point. 
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3.2. Trends in the Share of Short-term Japanese Government Securities, 2000-2011 
 
In this subsection, we discuss trends over time in the share of short-term Japanese government 
securities in Japanese government securities of all maturities during the 2000-2011 period. 
 
Figure 3 shows trends over time in the share of short-term Japanese government securities in 
Japanese government securities of all maturities of each sector during the 2000-2011 period, 
and as can be seen from this figure, the share of short-term Japanese government securities in 
Japanese government securities of all maturities varies greatly from sector to sector.  In recent 
years, it has been high for government financial institutions and foreign holders, lower for the 
Bank of Japan and private banks, and lowest for private insurance companies.  
 
Turning to trends over time in the share of short-term Japanese government securities in 
Japanese government securities of all maturities, this share has increased for most types of 
holders but increased the most sharply for government financial institutions (until 2009), foreign 
holders, and the Bank of Japan (until 2009), with private insurance companies and private 
banks not showing a clear trend one way or the other.  
 
As a result, the share of short-term government securities in government securities of all 
maturities increased from 10.1 percent in March 2000 to 37.4 percent in September 2011 in the 
case of foreign holdings, which is much higher than the corresponding figures for the Bank of 
Japan (25 percent) and private banks (20 percent).  This implies greater risk of capital flight 
since short-term securities are more liquid than medium- and long-term securities.  The 
corresponding figure for all holders increased through the 2000-2011 period (from 10.8 percent 
in March 2000 to 18.6 percent in September 2011) but is still relatively low because pension 
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funds invest a significant amount in medium- to long-term securities but almost nothing in short-
term securities.   
 
 
3.3. Trends in Foreign Holdings of Japanese Government Securities, 2000-2011 (Aggregate) 
 
In this subsection, we discuss trends over time in foreign holdings of Japanese government 
securities during the 2000-2011 period. 
 
Figure 4 shows trends over time in foreign holdings of Japanese government securities during 
the 2000-2011 period for both short-term and medium- and long-term securities, and as can be 
seen from this figure, the share of foreign holdings of Japanese government securities has been 
low until recently in the case of both short-term and medium- and long-term government 
securities, with the share of foreign holders of short-term government securities ranging from 
2.4 to 7.3 percent and that of medium- and long-term government securities ranging from 2.7 to 
6.7 percent during the March 2000 to September 2007 period.   
 
However, the two shares diverged greatly thereafter: the share of foreign holdings of short-term 
government securities increased sharply to 14.8 percent in June 2008 before falling to 10.1 
percent in December 2008 and increasing anew to 17.0 percent in March 2011 before leveling 
off, whereas the share of foreign holdings of medium- and long-term government securities has 
remained low, never exceeding the 7.8 percent level (increasing to 7.8 percent in September 
2008 before falling to 4.6 percent in March 2010 and increasing anew to 6.3 percent in 
September 2011). 
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Thus, the share of foreign holdings of government securities increased in the case of both short-
term and medium- and long-term government securities but increased much more sharply and 
was often more than twice as high in the case of short-term government securities than in the 
case of medium- and long-term government securities.   
 
Abundant domestic saving (especially household saving), combined with strong home bias (see, 
for example, Feldstein and Horioka (1980)), has until recently made it possible for Japan to 
absorb virtually all of the massive debt of the Japanese government domestically without having 
to rely on foreign holdings.  Japan’s household saving rate, which was for many years one of 
the highest in the world, has shown a steady downtrend since the mid-1970s, but robust 
corporate saving has more than offset the decline in household saving, as a result of which 
private saving has remained robust.  Nonetheless, the rapid increase in the debt of the 
Japanese government has made it increasingly difficult for all of it to be absorbed domestically, 
and this is one factor that has led to increased foreign holdings in recent years.  
 
Moreover, since 2005, the Japanese government has sought to diversify holders of Japanese 
government securities and to increase the previously low holdings of foreign investors, and this 
government policy is undoubtedly at least partly responsible for the steady increase in the share 
of foreign holdings of Japanese government securities since 2005. 
 
However, neither trends in domestic saving nor the Japanese government’s policy of 
encouraging foreign holdings of government securities can explain the divergent trends in the 
foreign holdings of short-term government securities and those of medium- and long-term 
government securities and thus other factors must be at play.    
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The divergent trends for short-term and medium- and long-term securities suggest that the 
growth in the appetite of foreign investors for Japanese government securities was much 
greater in the case of short-term securities than in the case of medium- and long-term securities, 
which in turn suggests that foreign investors regarded Japan as a “safe haven” (an economy 
offering safe and stable returns) and Japanese government securities as a temporary (short-
term) repository into which to invest their liquid assets in response to increased political and/or 
economic instability elsewhere (see, for example, Isard and Stekler (1985), Dornbusch (1986), 
and Habib and Stracca (2011)). 
 
Turning to comparative data for other economies to put the figures for Japan in international 
perspective, the share of foreign holdings of Italy’s government debt was 44 percent in 2010, 
according to International Monetary Fund estimates, and 47 percent, according to Morgan 
Stanley estimates.  The corresponding figure for the United Kingdom was 32.0 percent in 2010, 
according to an article in the April 28, 2010, issue of Keizai Rebyuu (Bank of Tokyo-Mitsubishi 
UFJ).  Finally, the share of foreign holdings of United States Treasury securities increased 
sharply from 17 percent in 2001 to 31 percent in 2011, according to United States government 
data.  As shown above, the corresponding figure for Japan has been at most 17 percent for 
short-term securities and at most 8 percent for medium- and long-term securities.  Thus, the 
share of foreign holdings of government securities is much lower in Japan than in Italy, the 
United Kingdom, and the United States. 
 
The Asian Bonds Online data base of the Asian Development Bank (Asian Development Bank 
(2012a)) provides data on trends over time in the share of foreign holdings of local currency 
government bonds in selected Asian economies since 1996, and as can be seen from this data 
base, the share of foreign holdings of local currency government bonds used to be higher in 
Japan than in other Asian economies but has been higher than in Japan (where it was a most 
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8.6 percent) in Malaysia since 2004 (as high as 27 percent), in Indonesia since 2005 (as high as 
34 percent), in Korea in 2007-08 and since 2009 (as high as 11 percent), and in Thailand since 
2010 (as high as 13 percent).  Thus, Japan has been overtaken by many Asian economies with 
respect to foreign holdings of government bonds, and the share of foreign holdings of 
government securities is now much lower in Japan than in both Western as well as Asian 
economies.  This suggests that barriers to international capital mobility are higher in the case of 
Japan than in the case of other economies, but the fact that capital inflows are non-negligible 
even in the case of Japan suggests that home bias is not so extreme even in the case of Japan.  
Our findings are broadly consistent with previous studies (see Obstfeld and Rogoff (2001), 
Apergis and Tsoumas (2009), and Horioka and Terada-Hagiwara (2013) for surveys of this 
literature). 
 
 
3.4. Trends in Foreign Holdings of Japanese Government Securities, 2000-2011 (by 
Economy or  Region) 
 
In the previous subsection, we discussed trends over time in total foreign holdings of Japanese 
government securities during the 2000-2011 period, but in this subsection, we discuss trends 
over time in the holdings of Japanese debt (mostly Japanese government securities) by 
individual economies and regions during the 2000-2011 period.  (The figures have been omitted 
due to space limitations.) 
 
Looking first at short-term debt, western Europe excluding the United Kingdom was the largest 
foreign holder of short-term Japanese debt in 2003-04 and 2007-09 and international institutions 
were the largest foreign holder of Japanese debt in the intervening years (viz., 2005-06 and 
2010-12).  By contrast, the importance of the ASEAN economies as holders of short-term 
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Japanese debt has increased sharply in recent years, rising to third place in 2009 and to second 
place in 2010-11. 
 
Turning to medium- and long-term debt, the United Kingdom was the largest foreign holder and 
western Europe excluding the United Kingdom was the second largest foreign holder of 
medium- and long-term Japanese debt through 2009, but they were both surpassed by 
international institutions and the ASEAN economies in 2010-11.   
 
Turning finally to debt of all maturities, the United Kingdom was the largest foreign holder of 
Japanese debt of all maturities until 2007 before falling to second place in 2008-09 and fifth 
place in 2010-11, while western Europe excluding the United Kingdom was the second largest 
foreign holder of Japanese debt of all maturities until 2007 before rising to first place in 2008-09 
and falling anew to third place in 2010-11.  By contrast, international institutions rose sharply 
from third place in 2009 to first place in 2010-11, while the ASEAN economies rose sharply from 
fourth place in 2009 to second place in 2010-11 and the PRC rose sharply from last (eighth) 
place to fourth place in 2010-11. 
 
Note, however, that in the case of the PRC, the lion’s share of holdings of Japanese 
government securities are held by the monetary authorities (the People’s Bank of China) as part 
of their foreign currency reserves, not by private investors, and that the decision-making 
calculus of the monetary authorities is likely to be very different from that of private investors 
and that the PRC diverted funds from the United States (in particular, from United States 
government securities), not from Europe.3   
 
                                                 
3 We are indebted to Peter Morgan for this point. 
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In sum, Europe was the largest foreign holder of Japanese debt of all maturities until 2009, 
suggesting that European investors were the most in need of temporary safe havens for their 
funds until 2009, but that she has been surpassed by international institutions, the ASEAN 
economies, and the PRC since 2009.  
 
 
3.5. Summary 
 
In this section, we presented data on trends over time in government debt financing in Japan 
during the 2000-2011 period and identified the rather dramatic trends that occurred during the 
past decade.  We showed that domestic investors have been the dominant holders of Japanese 
government securities throughout this period and that the importance of private investors 
(especially private banks and insurance companies) increased sharply over time (in the case of 
medium- and long-term government securities), whereas that the importance of government 
financial institutions declined sharply to virtually zero (since 2006 in the case of short-term 
government securities and throughout the 2000-2011 period in the case of medium- and long-
term government securities) due to the Japanese government’s policy of relying less on postal 
savings as a source of funds for financing the government debt.  With respect to foreign 
investors, we found that their importance has increased since 2000 in the case of both short-
term and medium- and long-term government securities and that there was an especially sharp 
increase in their importance in the case of short-term government securities after 2007 but that 
their importance is much less than in the West or in emerging Asia. 
 
 
4. REASONS FOR THE SHARP INCREASE IN FOREIGN HOLDINGS OF SHORT-TERM 
JAPANESE GOVERNMENT SECURITIES  
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One of the most striking findings of the previous section is that there has been a sharp increase 
in foreign holdings of short-term Japanese government securities in recent years.  Horioka, 
Nomoto, and Terada-Hagiwara (2013a) search for the reasons why foreign investors have 
increased their holdings of short-term Japanese government securities so sharply in recent 
years and find that it can be largely explained by the fact that (1) their yields increased relative 
to the yields on the government securities of other economies and regions because yields 
elsewhere fell sharply in 2008-09 due to monetary easing in response to the Lehman crisis and 
that (2) the gap between risk levels on Japanese government securities and those on the 
government securities of other economies and regions widened dramatically from late 2008 until 
early 2010 not because risk levels in Japan declined but because risk levels elsewhere 
increased sharply due to the advent of the eurozone crisis.  Both factors caused risk-adjusted 
hedged returns on government securities in other economies and regions to converge to  
Japanese levels in 2008-09 and remain below Japanese levels thereafter as well in some cases, 
which in turn induced foreign investors to at least temporarily shift their portfolios from the 
government securities of other economies and regions to Japanese government securities and 
caused foreign holdings of short-term Japanese government securities to increase sharply in 
recent years.   
 
Moreover, the finding of Horioka, Nomoto, and Terada-Hagiwara’s (2013a) econometric 
analysis that risk-adjusted returns are a significant determinant of foreign holdings of debt 
securities corroborates our contention that the fact that risk-adjusted returns elsewhere 
converged to Japanese levels in 2008-09 was responsible for the sharp increase in foreign 
holdings of short-term Japanese government securities after 2007 and suggests that 
conventional economic factors such as returns and risks can explain the behavior of foreign 
investors without having to resort to non-economic explanations.  
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It should be noted, however, that the sharp increase in foreign holdings of short-term Japanese 
government securities was largely attributable to central banks, especially the People’s Bank of 
China, and that central banks may have very different motivations from those of private 
investors.  For example, these central banks wanted to diversify away from U.S. government 
securities for various reasons and chose to shift into short-term Japanese government securities 
since they are more liquid than longer-term securities and hence more suitable for holding as 
foreign exchange reserves.4   
 
Unfortunately, a breakdown of foreign holdings of Japanese government securities by type of 
holder is not available and hence we cannot ascertain the importance of the “central bank 
hypothesis” directly.  However a breakdown of foreign holdings of Japanese government 
securities by economy and region is available, and in the case of short-term debt, Europe 
excluding the United Kingdom was the largest foreign holder of short-term Japanese debt in 
2003-04 and 2007-09 and international institutions were the largest foreign holder of Japanese 
debt in the intervening years (viz., 2005-06 and 2010-12).  By contrast, the importance of the 
ASEAN economies as holders of short-term Japanese debt has increased sharply in recent 
years, rising to third place in 2009 and to second place in 2010-11.  Thus, China has not held a 
dominant share of short-term Japanese debt until recently, suggesting that the “central bank 
hypothesis” has not been of dominant importance, at least until recently. 
 
 
5. SUMMARY OF FINDINGS AND POLICY IMPLICATIONS 
 
                                                 
4 We are indebted to an anonymous referee for this point. 
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In this paper, we analyzed data on trends over time in government debt financing in Japan since 
2010 with emphasis on the importance of foreign holders and speculated about the 
determinants of those trends.  
 
To summarize our main findings, we found that Japanese government securities were held 
primarily by domestic holders until recently because robust domestic saving (combined with 
strong home bias) made it possible for domestic investors to absorb most of the government 
debt but that foreign holdings of Japanese government securities have increased sharply in 
recent years, especially in the case of short-term government securities.  We showed that 
trends in foreign holdings of Japanese government securities can be explained by conventional 
economic factors such returns and risks and that the recent surge in foreign holdings of short-
term Japanese government securities is attributable to foreign investors in search of a safe 
haven for their funds in the face of the Global Financial Crisis of 2008-09 precipitated by the 
Lehman crisis.  
 
Thus, we found that Japan (in particular, the Japanese government) benefited greatly from the 
eurozone crisis even though Japan’s fiscal situation continues to be wobbly because it 
prompted at least a temporary shift in the portfolios of foreign investors towards relatively safe 
Japanese government securities, especially short-term Japanese government securities, which 
in turn has kept yields thereon lower than they would have been otherwise.   
 
However, the surge in foreign holdings of Japanese government securities will not continue 
indefinitely because risks in the rest of the world will eventually decline (in fact, risk levels on 
government securities in economies and regions other than Japan had already declined sharply 
by early 2010), because investors’ appetite for risk will eventually return as the eurozone crisis 
subsides, and because bond markets are developing in emerging Asia and creating increasing 
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competition for Japanese bonds, especially since they offer higher yields and the possibility of 
currency appreciation.  In fact, foreign holdings of short-term Japanese government securities 
have been falling sharply since peaking at 30.2 percent in September 2012, presumably for all 
of these reasons, and was only 26.8 percent in December 2012 and 28.6 percent in March 2013. 
 
Moreover, the current situation is even more tenuous than appears at first blush because the 
increasing share of foreign holdings and the shortening of maturities on Japanese government 
securities, especially on foreign holdings thereof, increase the difficulty of rollover and the risk of 
capital flight and because household and private saving rates in Japan can be expected to 
decline even further due to the continuing aging of her population (see, for example, Horioka, 
1989, 1991, 1992, and 1997), meaning that domestic banks and insurance companies will not 
continue to have sufficient bank and postal deposits, insurance policies, and pension funds from 
the household sector to invest in Japanese government securities. 
 
The policy implication of these findings is that, although Japan was able to “buy time” by 
inducing foreign investors to invest temporarily in Japanese government securities, the 
Japanese government still needs to get its fiscal house in order, preferably sooner rather than 
later.  And the most obvious ways of doing so are to increase tax revenues (for example, by 
raising the consumption tax, which is very low by international standards, as the Japanese 
government is in the process of doing), and/or to cut government expenditures (for example, by 
reforming the public pension system and other social safety nets).  The problem is that it is hard 
to implement such reforms in a country in which the economy is stagnant and still recovering 
from the earthquake, tsunami, and nuclear power plant accident of March 2011 and in which the 
government has lacked the political will to implement necessary fiscal and other reforms for 
many years.  
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To answer the question in the title of this paper, Japan’s massive government debt has not 
wreaked havoc in the past because of robust domestic saving and a temporary inflow of foreign 
capital caused by the Global Financial Crisis, but it may wreak havoc in the future as both of 
these factors become less applicable unless the government debt can be brought under control. 
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Country General Government Debt/GDP
Japan 219.1
Greece 165.6
Italy 140.2
Portugal 138.8
Iceland 131.8
Ireland 123.3
France 109.7
United States 106.3
Belgium 104.1
United Kingdom 103.9
Spain 90.5
Germany 89.2
Hungary 89.0
Canada 85.5
Austria 84.9
Netherlands 82.6
Israel 72.9
Finland 63.3
Poland 62.6
Slovenia 61.0
Denmark 58.9
Slovak Republic 56.6
Czech Republic 55.9
Sweden 48.7
New Zealand 44.3
Switzerland 43.8
Korea 35.1
Norway 34.6
Australia 32.4
Luxembourg 28.4
Estonia 14.2
Euro area （15 countries) 103.9
OECD - Total 108.8
Table 1 : General Government Debt as a Percentage of GDP, OECD
Countries, 2012
Source: Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD),
OECD Economic Outlook , no. 93 (May 2013).
Note: The figures show the ratio of general government gross financial liabilities
as a perrcentage of Gross Domestic Product (GDP) (in percent).
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Figure 1: Holdings of Short-term Japanese Government Securities by 
Sector, 2000-11 (Shares) 
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Source: Bank of Japan’s Flow of Funds Accounts Statistics 
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Figure 2: Holdings of Medium- and Long-term Japanese Government 
Securities by Sector, 2000-11 (Shares) 
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Source: Bank of Japan’s Flow of Funds Accounts Statistics 
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Figure 3: The Share of Foreign Holdings of Japanese Government 
Securities, 2000-2011  
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Source: Bank of Japan’s Flow of Funds Accounts Statistics 
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Figure 4: The Share of Short-term Securities in Japanese Government 
Securities of All Maturities by Sector, 2000-2011  
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